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Abstract
I present a unified account of interpretation preferences of stressed and unstressed pronouns
in discourse. The central intuition is the Complementary Preference Hypothesis that
predicts the interpretation preference of a stressed pronoun from that of an unstressed
pronoun in the same discourse position. The base preference must be computed in a total
pragmatics module including commonsense preferences. The focus constraint in Rooth’s
theory of semantic focus is interpreted to be the salient subset of the domain in the local
attentional state in the discourse context independently motivated for other purposes in
Centering Theory.
1 INTRODUCTION
Stressed pronouns present a peculiar class of anaphoric expressions. In-
formally, they communicate “old” as well as “new” information. They are
also at odds with the Topic–Focus Articulation (TFA)(Sgall, Hajicˇova´, and
Panevova´, 1986) — contextually bound, which is typical of Topic, in spite
of being in an intonational focus, which is a defining property of Focus and
common for a contextually unbound expression. They can also exemplify
the different notions of “focus” — psychological, semantic, or contrastive
focus (Gundel, this volume) — and can even combine them all at once. Un-
stressed pronouns (e.g., he, she, it, they) and their stressed counterparts (e.g.,
HE, SHE, THAT, THEY) often lead to drastically different interpretations.1
(Henceforth, stressed pronouns are in all uppercase.)
An account of the semantics and pragmatics of stressed pronouns needs to
explicate their peculiar hybrid behaviors and relation to unstressed pronouns.
Example (1) below shows two alternative continuations of the first utterance
1
— using an unstressed he and stressed HE. The preferred interpretations
indicated in the parentheses are opposite from each other.
(1) John hit Bill. Then {he | HE} was injured.
(he := Bill)(HE := John)
Similarly, variations of Lakoff’s (1971) example, (2) and (3) below, show
opposite preferred interpretations.
(2) Paul called Jim a Republican. Then he insulted him.
(Paul insulted Jim)
(3) Paul called Jim a Republican. Then HE insulted HIM .
(Jim insulted Paul)
In (2), the preferred interpretation of the unstressed pronouns establishes
grammatical parallelism between the two utterances. In (3), the preferred
interpretation of the stressed pronouns is the opposite from (2), and the
discourse acquires an additional assumption that “x insults y” follows from
“x calls y a Republican.”
The present approach focuses on the interpretation differences between the
stressed and unstressed counterparts — the stressed and unstressed versions
of the same pronominal form in the same position in discourse as well as in
a sentence. I assume that stressed and unstressed counterparts have exactly
the same denotational range — the same range of possible values. They also
share the same interpretation problem of choosing the preferred value. The
difference then comes from the latter. What is the difference in the preferred
values of unstressed and stressed counterparts? Is there a systematic relation
between them? Does one preferred value predict the other?
I claim that the difference between stressed and unstressed counterparts is
in the presuppositions, and that there is a systematic relation between them
coming from the interaction between the semantic focus interpretation of the
stressed pronoun and the centering principles associated with its unstressed
counterpart. The centering principles here are extended in the sense that
they are part of the total pragmatics that includes commonsense preferences.
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Under this unified approach, the systematic relation between the stressed
and unstressed counterparts is that of a complementary preference within a
suitable subset of the domain.
2 THE STRESSED PRONOUN AND SEMANTIC FOCUS
Rooth (1992) develops a theory of focus interpretation in terms of restricted
alternative semantics, where the focus semantics introduces a presupposed
constraint using a focus interpretation operator ∼. A focus phrase (or sen-
tence) α has a focus interpretation operator with a variable C (∼ C). C
may denote either individuals or sets of objects of the same type as the de-
notation of α, which are the elements or subsets of the focus semantic value
of α (henceforth [[α]]f ). C must contain the ordinary semantic value of α
(henceforth [[α]]o) and at least one more element or subset of C distinct from
[[α]]o, which is the contrasting element or subset for [[α]]o. Rooth points out
that the value of C is a discourse entity to which C is anaphoric, and that the
important question is how to constrain it. This opens up focus interpretation
to all sorts of discourse–pragmatic effects. In this paper, I will notationally
distinguish two types of presuppositional constraints after Rooth (1993) —
C for a set of propositions and F for a set of entities (individuals or groups
of individuals).
The Semantics of Stressed Pronouns. According to this theory of
semantic focus, a stressed HE presupposes a constraint ∼ F that there is a
contextually determined set of entities ([[HE]]f = {x | x ∈ F ⊆ E} where E
is the domain of individuals) with at least two members — the denotation
of HE ([[HE]]o) and at least one more contrasting individual. F is the
contextually available alternatives or the focus semantic value of HE. [[HE]]o
is an element of F , and F is a subset of E ([[HE]]o ∈ [[HE]]f = F ⊆ E).
An utterance (i.e., a sentence token in a context) with a focused element
presupposes a constraint ∼ C that there is a contextually determined set of
propositions obtained by instantiating a set abstraction with the alternative
values of the focused element — for instance, “HE was injured” presupposes
a constraint∼ C whose value is a set of propositions obtained by instantiating
the focus semantic value {injured(x) | x ∈ E} with the alternative values
of [[HE]]f . The ordinary semantic value of the utterance is a truth value
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that is an element of the focus semantic values ([[HE was injured]]o ∈
{injured(x) | x ∈ F} ⊆ {injured(x) | x ∈ E}).
The Pragmatics of Stressed Pronouns. Given the above focus seman-
tics, interpreting a stressed HE in an utterance U involves four pragmatic
subroutines. These subroutines are listed approximately in the following
bottom–up processing order, but no strict sequential order is assumed:
• Locate F ⊆ E, where F is a contextually determined set of entities that
may contain more than one potential referent for HE.
• Choose a member of F as [[HE]]o.
• Discharge ∼ C for U (which may contain other focused phrases) in the
current discourse context — in terms of a pending question or contrast-
ing proposition.
• Establish Coherence of [[U ]]o in the current discourse context; that is,
contribution of the utterance content to the evolving information state
must somehow make sense.
Each pragmatic subroutine consists of an interacting set of preferences, and
the combination of all the subroutines may or may not converge into a single
preferred interpretation of U . We will focus here on the preferences that affect
the locate and choose subroutines, with illustrations of how they interact with
the discharge subroutine. How is the relevant set of alternatives located?
How is the preferred value chosen? Rooth does not discuss these cases where
focus interpretation may also involve choosing among multiple alternatives.
This paper proposes an approach that spells out the missing detail in his
notion of restricted alternatives.
3 THREE BACKGROUND HYPOTHESES
Our present aim is to account for the systematic interpretation difference
between the stressed and unstressed counterparts. I motivate here the claim
that the interpretation of the unstressed counterpart should be the basis
from which to predict the interpretation of its stressed counterpart. The
claim rests on the following analogous characterization of the semantics and
pragmatics of the unstressed pronoun such as he and him.
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An unstressed he presupposes a constraint ∼ B that there is a contextually
determined set of entities ([[he]]f
′
= {x | x ∈ B ⊆ E}) with at least one
member — the denotation of he ([[he]]o). [[he]]o is an element of B and B is a
subset of E ([[he]]o ∈ [[he]]f
′
= B ⊆ E). Given this semantics, interpreting an
unstressed he in an utterance U involves the following pragmatic subroutines:
• Locate B ⊆ E, where B is a contextually determined set of entities that
may contain more than one potential referent for he.
• Choose a member of B as [[he]]o.
• Establish Coherence of [[U ]]o in the current discourse context.
Note that the sets of pragmatic subroutines for the stressed and unstressed
pronouns correspond one–on–one except for the additional discharge con-
straint on the utterance containing a stressed pronoun. This indicates that
the sum of the pragmatic constraints on the use of stressed pronouns may
be greater than on their unstressed counterparts. I therefore hypothesize the
following:
HYPOTHESIS 1 Given the range β of felicitous uses of unstressed pro-
nouns in discourse and the range α of felicitous uses of their stressed coun-
terparts, α ⊂ β.
The above hypothesis is borne out by examples of asymmetry such as the
following:
(4) Babar went to a bakery. he greeted the baker.
{he | ??HE} pointed at a blueberry pie.
The infelicity of the stressed HE is due to the difficulty in discharging the
presupposed focus constraint on the utterance (“x pointed at a blueberry
pie”) in terms of a pending question (“Who pointed at a blueberry pie?”) or
contrasting proposition (e.g., “someone did not point at a blueberry pie”).
Assuming the above hypothesis, we may conclude that if the preferred in-
terpretation of either the stressed or unstressed counterpart serves as the ba-
sis for deriving the other preferred interpretation, the base preference should
come from the unstressed counterpart, hence the second background hypoth-
esis:
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HYPOTHESIS 2 The preferred value of a stressed pronoun can be pre-
dicted by the preferred value of its unstressed counterpart.
There are remaining questions. What is the “contextually relevant subset”
B for the unstressed pronoun? What constraint, if any, does an utterance
containing an unstressed pronoun presuppose? In other words, is there an
unstressed pronoun analogue of ∼ C? I will propose an answer only to
the first of these questions. I will define the currently salient subset of the
domain of individuals in terms of the centering model of discourse (see the
next section), and motivate the third background hypothesis:
HYPOTHESIS 3 Stressed and unstressed counterparts choose their values
from the same salient subset of the domain of individuals (i.e., F = B).
If we are lucky, then, what we have is an integrated account of the semantics
and pragmatics of stressed and unstressed pronouns. Note that in order for
this hypothesis to work, we need to explain the discrepancy that the set F
for a stressed pronoun must contain at least two members, whereas B may
sometimes contain only one. I will argue that when the salient subset is a
singleton, the contrasting members are accommodated into the context to
satisfy the focus constraint of the stressed pronoun.
4 THE UNSTRESSED PRONOUN AND CENTERING
The problem of choosing among alternative values for pronouns has been
investigated in the framework of Centering Theory (Grosz, Joshi, and Wein-
stein, 1983, 1986, 1995).2 It is part of an overall theory of discourse structure
and meaning (Grosz and Sidner, 1986) that distinguishes among three com-
ponents of discourse structure — a linguistic structure, an intentional struc-
ture, and an attentional state — and two levels of discourse coherence —
global and local. Attentional state models the discourse participants’ focus
of attention determined by the intentional and linguistic structures at any
given point in the discourse. It has global and local components correspond-
ing to the two levels of discourse coherence. The global–level component is a
stack of focus spaces, where each focus space holds entities and propositions
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associated with a discourse segment, which is associated with a discourse
segment purpose in the intentional structure. Centering models the local–
level component of attentional state — how the speaker’s linguistic choices
for describing propositional contents affect the inference load placed upon the
hearer in discourse processing.
An utterance in discourse (not a sentence in isolation) has entities called
centers that link the utterance with other utterances in the same discourse
segment. They are the set of forward–looking centers (Cf) partially ordered
by relative prominence. One member of the Cf may be the backward–looking
center (Cb) that connects with a member of the Cf of the previous utter-
ance. The speaker’s linguistic choices define centering transitions that affect
the local coherence of the discourse. In English discourse, pronouns and
grammatical subjects are the main indicators of centering transitions (Grosz
et al., 1983, 1986, 1995; Kameyama, 1985, 1986; Brennan, Friedman, and
Pollard, 1987). Unstressed pronouns, in particular, are primarily used to
indicate the Cb in English–type languages (Kameyama, 1985:Ch.1).
Dynamic Preference Model. Kameyama (1996) develops an initial
model of interacting preferences for dynamically updating a multicomponent
context data structure in discourse processing. Centering preferences, stated
in terms of the attentional notion of salience, systematically interact with
structural and commonsense preferences to predict the preferred interpreta-
tion of unstressed pronouns. The perspective is that of total pragmatics that
includes both linguistic and commonsense preferences. This dynamic prefer-
ence model is summarized below. (A preference is stated as a defeasible rule
in the form of either “normally p” or “if p then normally q.”)
• Discourse is a sequence of utterances, U1, . . . , Un. Each utterance Ui
defines a transition relation between the input context Ci−1 and the
output context Ci.
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• Context C is a multicomponent data structure Ci = 〈φ
k
i , Ai, Di, . . .〉
including:4
– φki (LF Register) — the preferred interpretation k of the last ut-
terance Ui in a logical form that preserves aspects of the syntactic
structure of Ui.
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– Ai (Attentional State) — a set of currently “open” propositions
with the associated entities, into which a new utterance content
can potentially be integrated. The entities in Ai are partially
ordered by salience, and the most salient subpart of Ai is the local
attentional state, ALOCi (see below).
– Di (Discourse Model) — a structured information state for what
the discourse has been about (situations, eventualities, entities,
and relations among them), including the content of Ai.
• ALOCi (Local Attentional State)
5 — the entities realized6 by φki (cor-
responding to the Cf). One of them may be Centeri (corresponding
to the Cb)7 — the entity on which the current discourse segment is
centered. I assume that Centeri may be missing in Ai, especially at
the onset of a new discourse segment.
• In utterance interpretation, there are interacting preferences for up-
dating different context components. Some come from the linguistic
knowledge, and others come from the world knowledge.
The Role of the Attentional State. Various factors affect salience
dynamics — including utterance forms, discourse participants’ purposes and
perspectives, and the perceptually salient objects in the utterance situation.
Here we focus on the factor of utterance forms.
Two default linguistic hierarchies are relevant to the dynamics of salience
— grammatical function hierarchy (GF ORDER) and the nominal expression
type hierarchy (EXP ORDER):8
GF ORDER: Given a hierarchy [SUBJECT > OBJECT > OBJECT2
> Others], an entity realized by a higher–ranked phrase is normally
more salient in the output attentional state.
EXP ORDER: Given a hierarchy [Zero Pronominal > Pronoun >
Definite NP > Indefinite NP],9 an entity realized by a higher–
ranked expression type is normally more salient in the input attentional
state.
Since matrix subjects and objects cannot be omitted in English, the highest–
ranked expression type is the (unstressed) pronoun (Kameyama, 1985:Ch.1).
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From EXP ORDER, it follows that a pronoun normally realizes a maximally
salient entity (of an appropriate gender–number–person type) in the input
A. This accounts for the preference for a pronoun to corefer with the matrix
subject in the previous utterance as in the following example:10
(5) 1. John hit Bill. A1:[[John>Bill]φ1 . . . ]
2. Mary told him to go home. him := John≺Bill
The centering model is reinterpreted as follows:
CENTER: Centeri ∈ Ai is normally more salient than other entities in Ai.
EXP CENTER: An expression of the highest–ranked type in Ui normally
realizes Centeri in the output attentional state Ai.
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EXP ORDER and EXP CENTER combine to make a pronoun either estab-
lish or chain the Center (Kameyama, 1985, 1986).12 Centeri is “established”
(Centeri−1 6= Centeri) when a pronoun picks a salient non–Center in Ai−1
and makes it the Center in Ai. It is “chained” (Centeri−1 = Centeri) when
a pronoun picks Centeri−1 and outputs it as Centeri.
The maximally salient entity may be determinate in some attentional state
and indeterminate in others, depending on whether the GF–based salience
ordering and the Center–based one converge. A highest–ranked GF and the
Center may converge or diverge in the input A, affecting the preferred inter-
pretation of a pronoun.13 For instance, the Center realized by a sentence–
initial matrix subject pronoun is the single most salient entity, but the Center
realized by a nonsubject pronoun competes with the entity realized by the
subject, resulting in an indeterminacy.14 The different effects are illustrated
here:
(6) 1. Babar went to a bakery. A1:[[Babar>Bakery]φ1 . . . ]
2. he greeted the baker.
A2:[[[Babar]
Subj
Center>Baker]φ2>Bakery. . . ]
3. he pointed at a blueberry pie. he := Babar≺Baker
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(7) 1. Babar went to a bakery. A1:[[Babar>Bakery]φ1 . . . ]
2. The baker greeted him.
A2:[[Baker<>[Babar]
Obj
Center]φ2>Bakery. . . ]
3. he pointed at a blueberry pie. he := Baker≺?Babar
Example (6) shows the effects of determinate salience ranking in terms of a
chain of subject Centers. The preferred value of he in (6)–3 is determinate.
In contrast, the salience ranking in A2 is indeterminate in example (7). The
weak preference in (7)–3 comes from the interaction of attentional preference
and the separate preference for grammatical parallelism stated below.
The Role of the LF Register. The grammatical parallelism of two adja-
cent utterances in discourse affects the preferred interpretation of pronouns
(Kameyama, 1986), tense (Kameyama, Passonneau, and Poesio, 1993), and
ellipses (Pruest, 1992; Kehler, 1993). This general tendency warrants a sep-
arate statement. Parallelism is achieved, in the present account, by a com-
putation on the pair of logical forms, one in the LF register in the context,
and the other being interpreted:
PARA: The LF register in the input context and the utterance being inter-
preted seek maximal parallelism.15
We have observed in example (7) that this parallelism preference kicks in
when the salience–based preference is indeterminate.
The Role of the Discourse Model. Both linguistic semantics and com-
monsense preferences apply on the same discourse model. Lexically triggered
conventional presuppositions, for instance, constrain possible discourse mod-
els. Preferential rules assign a partial order on these models. Commonsense
preferences consist of all that an ordinary speaker knows about the world
and life. There will be a relatively small number of linguistic pragmatic rules
that systematically interact with and control an open–ended mass of com-
monsense rules. Our aim is to describe the former as fully as possible, and
specify how the “control mechanism” works. Linguistic rules should be sta-
ble across examples and domains, while there will be different commonsense
rules for each new example and domain. Example (1) illustrates a type of
causal knowledge:
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HIT: When an agent x hits an agent y, y is normally hurt.
Preference Interactions. Preferences relevant to unstressed pronoun in-
terpretation fall into three preference classes corresponding to the preferred
transitions of the three context components. CENTER, GF ORDER, EXP
ORDER, and EXP CENTER are defeasible Attentional Rules (ATT) stat-
ing the preferred A–transitions. PARA is an example of defeasible LF Rules
(LF) stating the preferred LF–transitions. HIT is an example of defeasi-
ble Commonsense Rules (WK) stating the preferred D–transitions. These
preference classes independently conclude the preferred interpretation of an
utterance, and these class–internal conclusions combine in a certain general
pattern to produce the final preference. Crucially, preferences can override
other preferences that contradict them. Ambiguities persist only when mu-
tually contradictory preferences are equally strong.
We have identified the following general patterns of preference interactions
in pronoun interpretation:16
• Indefeasible syntax and semantics (SYN+SEM) can override all prefer-
ences.
• Commonsense preferences can override attentional or parallelism pref-
erences. This overriding can be difficult, however, when the latter is
extremely strong, producing garden–path phenomena. Observe the
difference between “John hit Bill. He was severely injured.” (he :=
Bill≺John) and “Tommy came into the classroom. He saw Billy at the
door. He hit him on the chin. ??He was severely injured.” (he :=
Tommy is first chosen but retracted, and results in Billy).
• Attentional preferences can override parallelism preferences except for
the cases of parallelim induced by conventional presuppositions.
This general overriding pattern is schematically shown here, where ≥ rep-
resents a “can override” relation:
SYN+SEM ≥ WK ≥ ATT ≥ LF
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We have thus a fairly rich theory of interacting preferences in unstressed
pronoun interpretation. The question is the following — are they related to,
or better, predictive of the preferences relevant to the stressed counterpart?
5 COMPLEMENTARY PREFERENCE HYPOTHESIS
I claim that the preferred value of a stressed pronoun in discourse is pre-
dictable from the preferred value of its unstressed counterpart, and that they
draw their values from the same ‘currently salient’ subset of the domain. This
salient subset is the presupposed constraint F for the stressed pronoun and
B for the unstressed pronoun in Hypothesis 3.
In this unified view, this salient subset is the local attentional state, ALOC ,
or the “center of attention” in the dynamic context.
Salient Subset Hypothesis (SSH): An unstressed pronoun
and its stressed counterpart in utterance Ui draw their possible
values from the input local attentional state (ALOCi−1 = F = B).
Although the exact specification of ALOC is still open (see note 5), we take
the standard view in Centering Theory as the starting point in this paper
— it is the set of entities realized by the previous utterance in the given
discourse segment. It corresponds to the entities associated with the logical
form in the LF register in the present dynamic preference model.
Given the common presupposed subset of the domain, I hypothesize that
the preference order among the alternative values for a stressed pronoun is
the complement of the preference order for its unstressed counterpart:
Complementary Preference Hypothesis (CPH): A focused
pronoun takes the complementary preference of the unstressed
counterpart.
Restricting the salient subset is also crucial in this account, in order to avoid
an infinite regression into the least preferred entity in the entire universe of
discourse to get at the most preferred value for a stressed pronoun.
Computation of the Preferred Value. Given the CPH, the preferred
value of a stressed pronoun in utterance Ui is computed with the following
algorithm:17
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• Locate the local attentional state Bi−1 in the input context Ci−1.
Bi−1 contains a nonempty set of entities partially ordered by salience
(Bsaliencei−1 ).
18
• Compute Base Preference Order for Bsaliencei−1 for the unstressed counter-
part of the stressed pronoun, in terms of the interaction of LF rules, at-
tentional rules, and commonsense rules.19 The output is a subset Hi−1
of Bi−1 partially ordered by preference (H
pref
i−1 ), where Hi−1 ⊆ Bi−1
contains only the possible values of the pronoun within Bi−1.
• Compute Complementary Preference Order for Hprefi−1 as follows: x≺y
becomes y≺x, and x≺≻y does not change. With the CPH, this out-
puts the possible values of the stressed pronoun partially ordered by
preference (Hpref
∪
i−1 ).
• Discharge the presupposed constraint ∼ C for Ui (which may contain
other focused phrases). If Bi−1 is a singleton set, at least one additional
contrasting individual is accommodated (see below).
• Establish Coherence of [[Ui]]
o.
The algorithm is illustrated with example (1) (repeated here):
1. John hit Bill. C1: B
salience
1
={John>Bill}
2b. Then HE was injured.
B1 ⊇ H
pref
1 ={Bill≺John} ❀ H
pref∪
1 ={John≺Bill}
❀ HE := {John≺Bill}
The local attentional state in the input context for U2b contains John and
Bill, with John more salient than Bill. Both John and Bill are possible values
of he. The base preference for the unstressed counterpart results from the
WK rule (HIT) overriding ATT and LF rules, with Bill preferred over John.
The complementary preference makes John preferred over Bill for the stressed
pronoun. This preference then survives the presupposition discharging, which
recognizes the (indirect) contrast between “John was injured” and “John hit
Bill” and coherence establishing, which recognizes the Cause–Effect relation
between U1 and U2b.
The following variant of (1) illustrates a case where not all the entities in
B are possible values for the pronoun:
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1. John hit Bill in front of Mary.
C1: B
salience
1
={John>Bill>Mary}
2. Then HE was injured.
B1 ⊇ H
pref
1 ={Bill≺John} ❀ H
pref∪
1 ={John≺Bill}
❀ HE := {John≺Bill}
Here, B1 contains three individuals, John, Bill, and Mary, of which only two
are possible values of he. The interpretation of stressed HE in U2 is exactly
the same as in the previous example, however, since the base preference is
on the same subset H1.
Nakatani (1993) found in spontaneous narratives that a stressed subject
pronoun tends to signal (1) a local shift to a non–Cb in the Cf or (2) a global
shift to an old Cb within the segment. (1) is highly consistent with the
present account. (2) would also follow if the local attentional state contains
old Cbs in the segment as well as the Cf.
Indeterminate Preferences. This unified account predicts that when the
preferred value of an unstressed pronoun is indeterminate, the preferred value
for its stressed counterpart is likewise indeterminate because the complement
of an indeterminate order is still indeterminate. This prediction is borne out
in the following example:
(8) Jack and Bob are good friends. {??he | ??HE} is from Louisiana.
Neither Jack nor Bob is more salient than the other in the conjoined NP, and
neither parallelism nor commonsense preferences distinguish them, hence the
indeterminate preference for he. Its complement for HE is also indetermi-
nate.
Unambiguous Stressed Pronouns. The proposed mechanism correctly
predicts that when the pronoun in question is unambiguous, stressing does
not change its values. Since the stressed and unstressed counterparts draw
their possible values from the same singleton set, | H |= 1, the complementa-
tion operation produces the same possible value for the stressed counterpart.
The following examples illustrate such unambiguous pronouns:
(9) Jack and Mary are good friends. {he | HE} is from Louisiana.
{he | HE} := Jack
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(10) Jack is a physicist. {he | HE} is from Louisiana.
{he | HE} := Jack
The interpretation process of the stressed HE in example (9) is illustrated
here:
(9) 1. Jack and Mary are good friends.
C1: B
salience
1 ={Jack<>Mary}
2b. HE is from Louisiana.
B1 ⊇ H
pref
1 ={Jack} ❀ H
pref∪
1 ={Jack} ❀ HE := {Jack}
The preference complementation operation yields the correct unambiguous
value of the stressed pronoun, [[HE]]o, with no additional stipulations. A
possible alternative to the CPH such as “rule out the most preferred value in
H
pref
1 ” would not naturally extend to an account of unambiguous pronouns.
Recall the focus constraint ∼ F on stressed pronouns. The focus semantic
value of HE, F , must have at least two members — the denotation of HE
([[HE]]o) and at least one more contrasting individual. These contrasting
individuals also instantiate contrasting propositions that discharge the focus
constraint ∼ C on the utterance as a whole. Under the present proposal, F is
the set of entities in the local attentional state, which is also presupposed for
unstressed pronouns (F = B = ALOC), so ALOC must provide the contrasting
individuals. The question is — are they always supplied from ALOC rather
than A?
The present account makes use of nested subsets of the entities in A —
H ⊆ B = ALOC ⊆ A. Our examples in this paper indicate that these regions
are all potential sources for the contrasting individuals. We have seen the
following three sources for contrasting individuals:
• Alternative values within H ⊆ ALOC — examples (1) and (3)
• Individuals in ALOC that are not possible values of the pronoun but
belong to a common general class with the pronoun referent such as
person — example (9)20
• Not found in ALOC but potentially found in A — example (10).
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I will discuss what may happen in the third case.
When ALOC does not provide contrasting individuals, the focus constraint
for the stressed pronoun ∼ F is satisfied by discharging the focus constraint
on the utterance ∼ C by accommodation (Lewis, 1979) into the input atten-
tional state. For example, utterance U2b in both (9) and (10) generates the
same focus constraint ∼ C — “x is from Louisiana.” In (9), ALOC contains
the contrasting individual, Mary, and ∼ C is discharged by accommodating
a contrasting presupposition “Mary is not from Louisiana.” In (10), ALOC
does not contain contrasting individuals, and ∼ C is discharged by accommo-
dating a question “Who is from Louisiana?” This question presupposes other
persons in the domain, and if no persons have been explicitly mentioned, a
set of persons is implicitly accommodated into the current attentional state
A. A more precise formulation of this process will be left for a future task.
The present framework offers an explicit proposal about how the focus
constraints at both the phrase and utterance levels are discharged within the
nested structure of attentional state, and how contrasts are accommodated
when presuppositions do not immediately follow from the explicit discourse.
6 FURTHER QUESTIONS
There are a number of related questions, which I will only note here.
• The local attentional state is supposed to be relevant only for utterance
processing within a discourse segment. What happens to stressed and
unstressed pronouns in a segment–initial utterance? More generally,
how does the discourse structure affect pronoun interpretation?
• Intrasentential pronominal anaphora for both stressed and unstressed
pronouns is widely studied in syntax (e.g., Akmajian and Jackendoff,
1970; Lakoff, 1976; Williams, 1980; Lujan, 1985; Hirschberg and Ward,
1991). How does the present account relate to these syntactic facts?
How does it extend to the pragmatics of intrasentential pronominal
anaphora (e.g., Kameyama, to appear)?
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7 CONCLUSION
I have presented a unified account of interpretation preferences of stressed
and unstressed pronouns in discourse. The central intuition is expressed as
the Complementary Preference Hypothesis taking the interpretation prefer-
ence of the unstressed pronoun as the base from which to predict the inter-
pretation preference of the stressed pronoun in the same discourse position.
This base preference must be computed in a total pragmatics module in-
cluding commonsense preferences. I have also made a concrete proposal for
the pragmatically determined focus constraint in Rooth’s theory of semantic
focus. The salient subset of the domain in this proposal makes use of the
dynamically updated local attentional state in the discourse context indepen-
dently motivated for other purposes in Centering Theory. As a consequence,
the overall discourse processing can unify the interpretation process for the
two kinds of pronouns while explaining the source of the curious complemen-
tarity in their interpretation preferences.
NOTES
Notes
1Note that it cannot be stressed, and its stressed counterpart is THAT.
2Centering Theory synthesizes previous work on discourse focusing
(Grosz, 1977, 1981), immediate focusing (Sidner, 1979, 1983), and discourse
centering (Joshi and Kuhn, 1979; Joshi and Weinstein, 1981).
3Utterance U need not be a sentence in the standard syntactic sense. In
fact, it is more natural to think of U as a tensed clause, allowing multi-
ple intrasentential transitions within a complex sentence (see Kameyama, to
appear). This paper focuses only on intersentential anaphora, however.
4Indexical Context is notably omitted here.
5There are other highly salient entities that we are not considering in
this paper — for instance, the entities associated with the current discourse
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segment purpose, the old Center entities in the current discourse segment,
and the entities realized by possible antecedents in the current utterance.
6In the examples in this paper, realize simply means denote, but it com-
bines a variety of factors in a full account (see Grosz et al., 1995).
7Center corresponds to “topic proper” in TFA (Sgall et al., 1986).
8Both linguistic hierarchies are in fact recurrent in functional and typo-
logical studies of language. The GF ORDER closely resembles Keenan and
Comrie’s (1977) Accessibility Hierarchy, Givon’s (1979) Topicality Hierarchy,
and Kuno’s (1987) Thematic Hierarchy, all of which predict the preferred syn-
tactic structure for describing the things that a sentence is “mainly about”
within and across languages. The EXP ORDER resembles the linguistic
correlates of Gundel, Hedberg, and Zacharski’s (1993) Givenness Hierarchy,
which is closely related to Prince’s (1981) Familiarity Scale, which predicts
the relative degrees of accessibility of referents. It is of interest that virtu-
ally the same hierarchies are relevant to the computational interest in how
grammar controls inferences in language use.
9The distinction between stressed and unstressed pronouns in EXP OR-
DER in an earlier version (Kameyama, 1994) has been removed because the
ordering Unstressed Pronoun > Stressed Pronoun follows from the
present independent account of stress.
10I will henceforth notate the relation more salient than with >,
indeterminate salience ordering with <>, preferred over with ≺,
weakly preferred over with ≺?, and indeterminate preference ordering with
≺≻. Preferences in the subsequent examples come from the survey data dis-
cussed in Kameyama (1996).
11The “highest–ranked type” in EXP CENTER can be interpreted as either
relative to each utterance or absolute in all utterances. Under the relative
interpretation, a nonpronominal expression type can also output the Center
as long as there are no pronouns in the same utterance. Under the absolute
interpretation, only the pronominals (either zero or overt, depending on the
syntactic type of the language) can output the Center. I will take the ab-
solute interpretation in this paper following Kameyama (1985, 1986), based
on the rationale that the choice of the highest–ranked pronominal forms in
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a language should reflect a certain absolute sense of salience threshold.
12Chain corresponds to what I have previously called retain. It covers both
CONTINUE and RETAIN distinguished in Grosz et al. (1986, 1995).
13Discussions with Becky Passonneau helped clarify this point.
14Under the present perspective, the proposal to distinguish between CON-
TINUE and RETAIN transitions (Grosz et al., 1986, 1995) focuses on the
convergence of the highest–ranked GF (Cp) and the Center (Cb) in the output
attentional state.
15For a specific definition of parallelism, see, e.g., Pruest (1992),
Kameyama (1986).
16See Jaspars and Kameyama (1996) for a model of discourse logic that
incorporates the notion of preference classes.
17The subset Hi−1 was overlooked in the earlier formulation of the algo-
rithm in Kameyama (1994).
18Actually, this set can also be empty, in which case a plausible assumption
is that an accommodation takes place and obtains an indexically salient
entity.
19The salience order controls this computation.
20I assume a general sort hierarchy for the domain of individuals as pro-
posed by, e.g., Bosch (1988) and Prevost (1996), to compute the notion of ‘a
common general class’ under which a contrast is established.
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